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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
  
he Harvard Law School Program on International Law and Armed Con-
flict, the International Committee of the Red Cross Regional Delegation for 
the United States and Canada, and the Stockton Center for the Study of In-
ternational Law at the U.S. Naval War College recently hosted a workshop 
titled Global Battlefields: The Future of U.S. Detention under International Law.1 The 
workshop was designed to facilitate discussion on international law issues per-
taining to U.S. detention practices and policies in armed conflict. Workshop 
participants included members of government, legal experts, practitioners and 
scholars from a variety of countries. To encourage candid, productive debate 
and discussion, the workshop was conducted under Chatham House rule. 
While far from a new occurrence, detention for reasons related to armed 
conflict has presented numerous legal challenges in recent years. In particu-
lar, much debate has surrounded the law applicable to detention in non-in-
ternational armed conflicts (NIACs), or conflicts between a State and an or-
ganized non-State armed group or between two or more non-State armed 
                                                                                                                      
 The thoughts and opinions expressed in this report are meant to summarize key is-
sues raised at the workshop and do not necessarily reflect the views of the International 
Committee of the Red Cross, the Harvard Law School Program on International Law and 
Armed Conflict, the Stockton Center for the Study of International Law, the U.S. govern-
ment, the U.S. Department of the Navy or the U.S. Naval War College. 
1. The workshop occurred on May 16 and 17, 2016 at Harvard Law School. 
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groups).2 Not only has the sheer number of NIACs increased, but these con-
flicts, which previously often occurred solely within the territory of a single 
State, now frequently have extraterritorial elements, including cross-border 
hostilities or multinational military operations within a country. 
Controversy and a lack of clarity concerning detention in relation to NI-
ACs have arisen for a number of reasons. These include factual changes in 
the number of parties to the conflicts, the way parties are involved and the 
geographical terrain on which they are fought, as well as the relative paucity 
of codified rules governing detention in relation to NIACs particularly com-
pared to detention in relation to international armed conflicts (IACs) under 
international humanitarian law (IHL).3 Yet another reason is the set of chal-
lenges involved in determining how international human rights law (IHRL) 
and IHL interact in relation to armed conflict. As a result, parties to the con-
flict and other relevant actors are often faced with complicated legal ques-
tions centered on whether they may engage in detention and, if so, what 
procedural guarantees should be provided, under what conditions as well 
when detainees must be transferred or be released. 
                                                                                                                      
2. It is important to note that there was not necessarily an agreed upon definition of 
NIAC detention during the workshop. The discussion centered on “security detention” in 
NIACs, which, for the purposes of clarity in this report, will refer to a deprivation of liberty 
in relation to an armed conflict where criminal prosecution is not envisaged. Security deten-
tion in relation to an armed conflict is sometimes also referred to as internment, adminis-
trative detention or NIAC detention. 
Concerning the scope of applicable international law to NIACs, see, for example, Con-
vention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces 
in the Field art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter GCI]; Conven-
tion for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members 
of Armed Forces at Sea art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter 
GCII]; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter GCIII]; Convention Relative to the Protection of 
Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 3, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [here-
inafter GCIV]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August and relating to 
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter APII]; Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court arts. 
8(2)(c), (d), (e), and (f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [hereinafter Rome Statute]; Prose-
cutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory 
Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995). See 
also International Committee of the Red Cross, How is the Term “Armed Conflict” Defined in 
International Humanitarian Law? (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross Opinion Paper, March 2008), 
http://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/opinion-paper-armed-conflict.pdf. 
3. Also referred to as the law of war or the law of armed conflict. 
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Multiple bodies of law may be relevant in helping to answer these ques-
tions—in particular IHL, IHRL and domestic law.4 The predominant focus 
at the workshop was on IHL, which, among other things, governs the con-
duct of hostilities and provides protections for those not, or no longer, di-
rectly participating in hostilities. The underlying purpose and structure of 
IHL, it is often said, rests upon a balance between considerations of military 
necessity and humanity.5 The main treaty provisions establishing the rules 
for NIACs are Common Article 3 of the four Geneva Conventions of 19496 
and Additional Protocol II.7 Customary law also regulates NIACs, although 
the precise rules considered to reflect customary international law are de-
bated.8 
This report attempts to capture the main debates that arose in each ses-
sion. Over the course of the workshop, the key issues discussed were as fol-
lows: 
 
 Legal basis for detention; 
 Grounds and procedures for detention; 
 Treatment of those detained; 
 Disposition; 
 Detention by armed groups; 
 State responsibility for actions of armed groups; 
                                                                                                                      
4. In addition, it may be relevant to assess other bodies of law, such as jus ad bellum, 
which governs the resort to the use of force in international relations, and international 
criminal law, to determine what body of law applies and how to pursure accountability, 
respectively. 
5. See, e.g., Mike Schmitt, Military Necessity and Humanity in International Humanitarian Law: 
Preserving the Delicate Balance, 50 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795 (2010); 
YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL 
ARMED CONFLICT 5 (2d ed. 2009). 
6. GCIV, supra note 2, art. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts 
art. 3, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3. 
7. APII, supra note 2, art. 1. 
8. CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Jean-Marie Henckaerts & 
Louise Doswald-Beck eds., 2005) (identifying 148 of its 161 rules as being applicable to 
NIACs as well as IACs) [hereinafter ICRC CIHL Study]. To read an initial response to the 
ICRC’s customary law study, see, for example, John B. Bellinger, III & William J. Haynes, 
II, 89 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 443 (2007), https://www.icrc.org/ 
eng/assets/files/other/irrc_866_bellinger.pdf. 
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 The future of the U.S.-run detention facility at Guantanamo Bay, 
Cuba; and 
 The future of detention related to NIACs more generally. 
 
Given the diversity of approaches taken to many of these issues and the per-
ceived interconnectedness of various issues, many points resurfaced in mul-
tiple sessions. Certain issues therefore are repeated under several of the head-
ings in this report and it does not purport to draw conclusions or provide a 
comprehensive overview of the discussions. 
 
II. SESSION ONE 
 
The focus of discussion in this session centered on whether a legal basis for 
detention in extraterritorial NIACs is necessary, and, if so, whether such a 
basis may be found in IHL or another body of law. In addition to debating 
this question of authorization—or lack thereof—for detention in relation to 
NIACs, participants also raised the importance of considering grounds and 
procedures for such detention. These latter two issues were primarily ad-
dressed during Session Two. 
Regarding the first issue, on whether a legal basis for detention in NIACs 
is required, several commentators noted that States generally do not need 
international law to authorize their acts, particularly if such acts occur within 
their own territory. Consequently, those arguing for this position noted that, 
even if one did not view IHL governing NIACs as authorizing security de-
tention, it would be necessary to seek a legal basis for that detention only if 
the detention would violate another rule of international law. For example, 
the prohibition in IHRL against arbitrary deprivation of liberty,9 or if one 
State was acting in a way that would interfere with another State’s sovereignty 
such as undertaking a detention operation in the territory of a second State 
without that State’s consent or absent another valid legal basis. 
Examination of the view that a legal basis for detention in relation to 
NIACs is needed brought about discussion as to whether such a basis could 
be found and, if so, in what body, or bodies, of law. With respect to IHL, 
this debate focused in part on whether IHL affirmatively authorizes detention 
                                                                                                                      
9. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9, Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
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in relation to a NIAC10 or simply does not prohibit it. The diverse views on 
this matter often dealt with overlapping issues, many with different underly-
ing rationales and approaches to the legal regulation of NIACs more gener-
ally. These views fell under the following categories: 
 
1. Regulation of detention in IHL implies an authorization to de-
tain. Some commentators considered that because IHL regulates de-
tention, it contains an inherent authority to detain. At least one par-
ticipant linked this view to the fact that detention is not prohibited 
by Common Article 3 and is explicitly contemplated by AP II.11 Fur-
thermore, it was noted, though more from a pragmatic perspective, 
detention occurs frequently in armed conflict by both States and 
armed groups. Yet, some commentators argued that IHL often reg-
ulates activity that might be prohibited by other rules or principles 
of international law, and thus regulation by IHL does not necessarily 
imply authorization. 
 
2. Conduct-of-hostilities rules in IHL permitting killing imply a 
power to detain. A view was expressed that, because IHL permits 
the killing of certain individuals and extensively regulates the use of 
lethal force, IHL must also provide a legal basis for detention. De-
tention, per this reasoning, is a “lesser” infringement of humanity 
than killing, and the principle of humanity is a fundamental principle 
of IHL. In response to this approach, some commentators argued, 
first, that killing is not, in their view, authorized by IHL. Second, those 
commentators expressed their view that, in any event, one cannot 
equate the categories of people who may be detained under IHL with 
those who may be killed under IHL. 
 
                                                                                                                      
10. Treaty law is seen by many as providing a legal basis for detention in IACs. See, e.g., 
GCIII, supra note 2, art. 21 (allowing for the detention of certain individuals who qualify as 
prisoners of war); GCIV, supra note 2, arts. 4, 78 (providing that occupying powers may 
intern “protected persons” for “imperative reasons of security”). See also id. art. 42 (stating 
that in international armed conflict to aliens in the territory of the party to the conflict, States 
may intern protected persons “only if the security of the Detaining Power makes it abso-
lutely necessary”). 
11. APII, supra note 2, arts. 5, 6. 
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3. A norm of customary IHL authorizing NIAC detention might 
be developing. Even if, at the time the relevant treaties were 
drafted, States did not intend for IHL to authorize detention in rela-
tion to NIACs, subsequent practice of States and/or opinio juris 
could, per another argument concerning possible sources of such de-
tention authority, point to a developing norm of customary interna-
tional law.12 
 
4. There is no inherent or implied authority to detain under IHL. 
Per this view, although IHL does not prohibit detention in NIACs, 
it also does not provide a legal basis to detain. 
 
With respect to whether a legal basis to detain in relation to extraterrito-
rial NIACs could be found in a source other than IHL, the discussion fo-
cused on the following two areas: 
 
1. Domestic Law. It was suggested that a State could find the authority 
to detain pursuant to its own domestic law. For example, it was sub-
mitted that the United States’ 2012 National Defense Authorization 
Act13 provides a sufficient legal basis to detain certain individuals. 
However, there was some dispute as to whether the 2001 Authori-
zation for Use of Military Force (AUMF)14 provided sufficient do-
mestic authority for U.S. detentions that occurred before 2012.15 
                                                                                                                      
12. In this regard, a resolution from the 32nd International Conference of the Red 
Cross and Red Crescent was specifically mentioned. International Committee of the Red 
Cross, Strengthening International Humanitarian Law Protecting Persons Deprived of their 
Liberty: Resolution (2015). 
13. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, Pub. L. No. 112−81, 
§1021, 125 Stat. 1298, 1562 (2011) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 801 note (2012)), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/PLAW-112publ81/pdf/PLAW-112publ81.pdf. 
14. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). 
15. The 2001 AUMF does not explicitly provide the authority to detain individuals; 
rather, it explicitly authorizes the president to 
use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any 
future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organiza-
tions or persons. 
U.S. courts have upheld the legality of detention of individuals who were considered mem-
bers of al Qaeda or associated forces under the 2001 AUMF. The 2012 NDAA provided 
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One commentator believed that it did, stating that international law 
did not require explicit, specific domestic law providing the basis to 
detain. Another view contested that analysis, claiming that—to avoid 
being “arbitrary” and, therefore, to avoid violating IHL and human 
rights law—the legal basis, grounds and procedures needed to be 
sufficiently clear in law. In addition, several commentators noted that 
States often introduce domestic laws to address situations of public 
emergency. 
 
2. United Nations Security Council Resolution. A UN Security 
Council resolution was discussed as another potential means of 
providing a legal basis for NIAC security detention. There were com-
peting views as to whether a Security Council resolution could pro-
vide the necessary specificity.16 It was noted that this authority, where 
established, would be provided to States but would not necessarily 
be provided to armed groups. Moreover, it was mentioned that a 
State would be unlikely to enact a domestic law granting non-State 
armed groups (NSAGs) the authority to detain. 
 
The issue of grounds and procedures for detention was then introduced, 
although this topic was discussed in more detail during Session Two. Irre-
spective of whether a legal basis for “security detention” in NIACs was seen 
to exist, the importance of spelling out grounds and procedures was high-
lighted by a number of participants. In the eyes of these participants, security 
detention in armed conflict could still be viewed as “arbitrary” under human 
rights law if the grounds and procedures for such detention were not ade-
quately established. Thus, these commentators averred that a sufficiently 
specific three-pronged “package”—concerning legal basis, grounds and pro-
cedures—is necessary for such detention to conform to international law. 
                                                                                                                      
the first explicit authorization to detain members of al Qaeda, the Taliban or associated 
forces, although the exact definition and scope of “associated forces” is still widely debated. 
For an a detailed discussion, see Oona Hathaway, Samuel Adelsberg, Spencer Amdur, Philip 
Levitz & Freya Pitts, The Power to Detain: Detention of Terrorism Suspects After 9/11, 38 YALE 
JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 123 (2013). 
16. See, e.g., Lawrence Hill-Cawthorne & Dapo Akande, Does IHL Provide a Legal Basis 
for Detention in Non-International Armed Conflicts?, EJIL: TALK! (May 7, 2014), 
http://www.ejiltalk.org/does-ihl-provide-a-legal-basis-for-detention-in-non-international-
armed-conflicts/; see also LAWRENCE HILL-CAWTHORNE, DETENTION IN NON-INTERNA-
TIONAL ARMED CONFLICT (2016). 
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It was proposed that in extraterritorial NIACs, agreements between a 
host State and an invited State, the domestic law of a host State, or standard 
operating procedures (SOPs) could provide (at least some of) the specificity 
required for grounds and procedures to conform to the principle of legality. 
However, concern was expressed as to whether such SOPs would be suffi-
ciently binding as a legal obligation. Further, some participants believed that 
it might be difficult for NSAGs to utilize any of these methods, whatever 
the type of NIAC, potentially resulting in a scenario where NSAGs could 
not engage in detention. According to these participants, such a position 
would likely be rejected by NSAGs and might result in NSAGs choosing to 
forgo detention and, instead, rely on more lethal targeting or, potentially, 
resort to unlawful summary executions of captives. 
Finally, the group discussed whether the standard of “imperative reasons 
of security,” which is laid down in IAC treaty law governing the deprivation 
of liberty of certain civilians,17 is a satisfactory ground for security detention 
in relation to NIACs. While some participants considered the standard to be 
appropriate for NIACs, others raised concern as to its vagueness, suggesting 
that it might be too broad. The additional approach of considering member-
ship in an armed group to be a sufficient ground for security detention was 
briefly discussed in this session and returned to in a number of later sessions. 
 
III. SESSION TWO 
 
The main procedural guarantees for security detention discussed in this ses-
sion were the right to know the reasons for detention (including translation 
into a language understood by the detainee); the right to challenge the law-
fulness of detention; review of detention and the independence and impar-
tiality of the body conducting the review; and the ability to contact family. 
In addition, the issue of grounds to deprive a person of his or her liberty in 
relation to NIACs was revisited in the context of when detainees should be 
released. 
Before considering the specific guarantees, the session began with a con-
versation around the preliminary issue of when detention for security rea-
sons actually begins. This question was said to be important because certain 
procedural requirements need to be fulfilled only once security detention has 
                                                                                                                      
17. GCIV, supra note 2, arts. 4, 78 (providing that occupying powers may intern “pro-
tected persons” for “imperative reasons of security”). See also id. art. 42 (“The internment or 
placing in assigned residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the 
Detaining Power makes it absolutely necessary.”). 
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been initiated. There was concern that notwithstanding the significance of 
this threshold, international law on the matter is sparse. A view was ex-
pressed that, following capture, security detention begins as soon as the de-
cision has been made to continue to hold someone. Accordingly, procedural 
guarantees are triggered from that point forward. This view led to the ques-
tion of how long a detaining power has to decide if it will continue to hold 
an individual. A variety of options was mentioned. For example, the Inter-
national Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan policy of 96 hours was 
referenced,18 while certain international human rights bodies articulate 48 to 
72 hours as the relevant time period.19 Drawing from the Fourth Geneva 
Convention’s (GC IV) requirement of prompt notification (normally within 
two weeks) of the internment or assigned residence of any protected per-
son20—a requirement that does not apply as a matter of treaty law in relation 
to NIACs—the same period was proposed as another option for NIACs, 
with detention for security beginning on the fifteenth day if no decision had 
been officially reached before then. 
On the question of procedural safeguards generally, concern was raised 
that even if some States have detailed procedures, such as the U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense’s Law of War Manual,21 the fact that each State currently 
                                                                                                                      
18. International Security Assistance Force, SOP 362, Detention Of Non-ISAF Per-
sonnel ¶ 5 (Dec. 6, 2011) (“The current policy for ISAF is that Detention is permitted for a 
maximum of 96 hours after which time an individual is either to be released or handed into 
the custody of the ANSF/GOA.”). See also Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence [2015] 
EWCA (Civ) 843 [259] (referencing UK Standard Operating Instruction J3-9 (Amendment 
1, §4, Amendment 2, §6) as providing authorization to detain for up to 96 hours) [hereinafter 
Mohammed 2015]. 
19. U.N. Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 35, Article 9: Liberty and 
Security of Person, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35, ¶ 33 (Dec. 16, 2014) (48 hours), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/553e0f984.html [hereinafter UNHRC General Comment 
35]; U.N. Human Rights Committee, Comm. No. 770/1997, Gridin v. Russian Federation, 
Annex, ¶ 8.1, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/69/D/770/1997 (July 18, 2000) (72 hours), http://hrli-
brary.umn.edu/undocs/session69/view770.htm. 
20. See GCIV, supra note 2, art. 136 (stating that “within the shortest possible period, 
give its Bureau information of any measure taken by it concerning any protected persons 
who are kept in custody for more than two weeks, who are subjected to assigned residence 
or who are interned”). 
21. OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, LAW OF 
WAR MANUAL ch. 8 (rev. ed., Dec. 2016) [hereinafter DOD LOW MANUAL]; Headquarters 
Departments of the Army, Navy, Air Force & Marine Corps, AR 190–8/OPVAVINST 
3461.6/AFJI 31-304/MCO 3461, Enemy Prisoners of War, Retained Personnel, Civilian 
Internees and Other Detainees (1997). 
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follows its own domestic procedures risks creating a patchwork of rules. 
This, in the view of some participants, could produce an illogical—or, at 
least, inconsistent—system of rules for multilateral operations because the 
procedural guarantees to which a detainee is entitled might vary depending 
on which coalition partner was holding the individual. Moreover, this patch-
work approach could give rise to challenges to contributing States as to how 
they could provide maximum protections to detainees. It was suggested that 
further clarification of procedural safeguards is also necessary due to the 
possibility that some States might increasingly resort to short-term detention. 
There was some debate as to whether General Comment 35 of the Human 
Rights Committee, on the subject of Article 9 (liberty and security of person) 
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), ade-
quately addressed detainees held by foreign States in relation to NIACs with 
an extraterritorial element.22 
Regarding specific guarantees, there was consideration of the nature of 
an independent and impartial reviewing body and what factors and indicators 
might be relevant to it. However, more time was devoted to discussion 
around the right to review of one’s deprivation of liberty and the decision to 
detain, continue to detain, transfer or release the individual. A number of 
participants considered six months to be an appropriate timeframe for auto-
matic, recurring review, in light of the requirement to review the internment 
of civilians “at least twice yearly” under Article 43(1) of GC IV. It was also 
                                                                                                                      
22. UNHRC General Comment 35, supra note 19, ¶ 64 (“Security detention authorized 
and regulated by and complying with international humanitarian law in principle is not ar-
bitrary.”); ¶ 65 
States parties derogating from normal procedures required under article 9 [of the ICCPR] 
in circumstances of armed conflict or other public emergency must ensure that such dero-
gations do not exceed those strictly required by the exigencies of the actual situation. Dero-
gating measures must also be consistent with a State party’s other obligations under inter-
national law, including provisions of international humanitarian law relating to deprivation 
of liberty, and non-discriminatory. The prohibitions against taking of hostages, abductions 
or unacknowledged detention are therefore not subject to derogation. 
¶ 66 
Outside [the context of international armed conflicts], the requirements of strict necessity 
and proportionality constrain any derogating measures involving security detention, which 
must be limited in duration and accompanied by procedures to prevent arbitrary application, 
as explained in paragraph 15 above, including review by a court within the meaning of par-
agraph 45 above. 
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noted that some documents do not specify the period of review,23 perhaps 
in order to provide for operational flexibility. 
On the question of the circumstances in which continued security deten-
tion might be justified where criminal proceedings have not been initiated, 
several commentators considered that an individual must continue to con-
stitute a security threat in order to remain detained. Thus, in this respect, 
they embraced the standard of an “imperative threat to security” for NIAC 
detention, which is laid down in GC IV concerning (continued) detention by 
the occupying power of certain civilians in a situation of belligerent occupa-
tion.24 However, even regarding the standard of a threat to security, there 
was some debate as to what would constitute such a threat. For example, 
some considered that membership in a NSAG could be a sufficient reason 
for prolonged detention, while others disagreed. Several participants sug-
gested that the standard for determining the point at which release is required 
should be the same as that initially used to establish that the person consti-
tuted a threat to security. Others held that the two standards should not nec-
essarily be equated. This set of topics was returned to in later sessions. 
It was noted that, even if the proposal that an individual must remain an 
“imperative threat to security” to justify continued detention was adopted, 
the issue of identifying an appropriate standard for determining that threat 
would arise. A participant recommended that the more time that passes since 
an individual was detained, the more demanding the standard should be for 
the detaining power to demonstrate that the detainee posed an imperative 
threat to security. One example raised concerned long-term detention where 
criminal proceedings were not instituted. In that context, it was suggested, 
that after a period of two years something exceptional, such as new evidence, 
was generally necessary for the State to continue to detain those persons. An 
assumption underlying this argument seemed to be that, over time, the link 
between an individual and the reasons underlying the assessment that he or 
she posed a sufficient threat to the detaining power’s security attenuates.  
One participant pointed to publicly available U.S. NIAC detention re-
view standards, such as those found in the Guantanamo Review Task Force 
                                                                                                                      
23. See, e.g., The Copenhagen Process on the Handling of Detainees in International 
Military Operations, The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines (2012), 
http://um.dk/en/~/media/UM/English-site/Documents/Politics-and-diplomacy/Co-
penhangen%20Process%20Principles%20and%20Guidelines.pdf [hereinafter Copenhagen 
Principles and Guidelines]; see also DOD LOW MANUAL, supra note 21. 
24. GCIV, supra note 2, art. 78. 
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Report of 2010.25 Generally, these review mechanisms are considered to be 
a matter of U.S. policy and not to constitute legal requirements.26 It was ex-
plained that the reviews are “forward-looking” (in the sense of assessing cur-
rent and future, not past, threat) and consider the personal attributes of the 
individual, including change of mindset. This generated some divergent 
views as to whether mindset, in the form of allegiance to a group, could (or 
should) be considered as a criterion for what constitutes a continued threat 
to security. 
Discussion also touched on whether review standards adopted as a mat-
ter of policy, but not as a matter of law, should be sufficient, especially where 
those policy-based review standards are similar in substance to the obliga-
tions the law would impose. One participant believed that a lack of detailed 
legal standards was not necessarily problematic, as it allowed approaches to 
be tailored to the large variety of situations that could involve detention. 
Another participant disagreed, arguing that such an approach did not pro-
vide sufficient consistency or promote the rule of law. 
 
IV. SESSION THREE 
 
Participants discussed the treaty provisions and customary rules governing 
treatment of detainees in NIACs, as well as relevant policy guidelines and 
soft law. Several commentators highlighted the shortage of NIAC treaty pro-
visions regulating treatment of persons deprived of liberty.27 In turn, they 
argued that an increased reliance on IHRL rules governing treatment was 
therefore necessary. 
                                                                                                                      
25. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DEPARTMENT OF 
STATE, DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR OF NA-
TIONAL INTELLIGENCE & JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, FINAL REPORT GUANTANAMO REVIEW 
TASK FORCE (2010), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ag/legacy/2010/06/02/ 
guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf [hereinafter FINAL REPORT GUANTANAMO REVIEW 
TASK FORCE]. 
26. There are other examples of U.S. NIAC detention review processes granted as a 
matter of policy, such as the Guantanamo Periodic Review Boards or the Detention Review 
Boards in Afghanistan. See U.S. Department of Defense, Periodic Review Secretariat (last 
visited June 28, 2017), http://www.prs.mil/. 
27. In this regard, it should be noted that Additional Protocol II has more provisions 
regulating treatment and that these provisions have a more specific scope than those ex-
pressly stated in Common Article 3. 
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The session included a discussion of which IHL provisions apply to 
treatment of detainees in a NIAC. In terms of treaty law, Common Article 3 
establishes a requirement of humane treatment and Articles 4 and 5 of Ad-
ditional Protocol II provide additional treatment obligations, including those 
related to health and religion for conflicts subject to the Protocol. Some par-
ticipants noted that the full contours of the customary IHL rules applicable 
to NIACs are unclear. The International Committee of the Red Cross’s Cus-
tomary International Humanitarian Law study states that many of the relevant 
Additional Protocol II rules—such as prohibitions on corporal punishment 
and collective punishments—apply in all NIACs.28 Some participants sug-
gested that the nonbinding Copenhagen Process Principles and Guidelines29 
might have interpretive value concerning treatment standards. 
Some expressed the view that the sparsity of IHL treaty rules on detainee 
treatment in relation to NIACs should prompt reflection upon IHRL and 
guidelines. In terms of guidelines, the United Nations’ Nelson Mandela 
Rules30 and the UN Human Rights Committee’s General Comment 3531 
were mentioned. If it was deemed necessary to develop international law 
governing detainee treatment in relation to NIACs, a commentator sug-
gested that it was preferable to transpose, mutatis mutandis, IAC rules instead 
of those found in IHRL. The rationale put forward in support of that posi-
tion was that IAC detainee treatment standards under IHL are more detailed 
and appropriate to the context than IHRL standards.32 
Several specific treatment issues were also raised. There was a discussion 
about whether so-called “force feeding” caused pain or suffering that vio-
lates IHL or IHRL. One participant proposed that the answer depended on 
the degree of pain. If the force feeding is intended to keep a prisoner alive 
                                                                                                                      
28. ICRC CIHL Study, supra note 8. It should be noted, however, that AP II has been 
interpreted to impose a higher threshold of application than Common Article 3. See, e.g., 
Jelena Pejic, The Protective Scope of Common Article 3: More Than Meets the Eye, 93 INTERNA-
TIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1, 2 n.1 (2011). 
29. Copenhagen Principles and Guidelines, supra note 23. 
30. United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (the Nel-
son Mandela Rules), G.A. Res. 70/175 (Jan. 8, 2016). 
31. UNHRC General Comment 35, supra note 19. 
32. For more background on this view, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS, STRENGTHENING INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW PROTECTING PERSONS 
DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTY (2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/download/file/6588/ 
background-document-all-states-compliance-apr-2015.pdf; see also INTERNATIONAL COM-
MOTTEE OF THE RED CROSS INTERNMENT IN ARMED CONFLICT: BASIC RULES AND CHAL-
LENGES, (2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/internment-armed-conflict-basic-
rules-and-challenges. 
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and does not cause severe pain and suffering, it could, according to this view, 
even be considered a humane act. By another view, force feeding is clearly 
unlawful. Per this argument, if a hunger strike is the result of an informed 
decision, then it is a legitimate protest, and force feeding does not constitute 
an acceptable response. As a separate issue, one participant mentioned that 
family contact is an important treatment issue, as is the avoidance of solitary 
confinement, access to open air, exercise and when and how searches occur. 
Many of these issues, it was argued, are not dealt with explicitly in IHL under 
NIAC treaty provisions or customary law. It was also proposed that long-
term adult care facilities could provide a better model of the sort of facilities 
that should be used to house Guantanamo detainees, rather than prisons. 
The matter of law versus policy also arose in the treatment context. In 
this connection, a desire for operational flexibility was recognized by some 
participants, who also believed that legal obligations of greater specificity are 
unnecessary so long as policy guidance meets a sufficient standard. Other 
participants noted that policy could shift with a change in political leadership, 
thereby making policy standards impermanent. 
 
V. SESSION FOUR 
 
The disposition of people deprived of their liberty in relation to NIACs may 
take many forms. Examples include release, transfer, institution of civil or 
criminal proceedings and (continued) security detention. This session fo-
cused almost entirely on disposition examples from two States—the United 
States and Colombia. Discussion around the former concentrated predomi-
nantly on issues surrounding the transfer of detainees, while discussions on 
the latter centered on the prosecution of detainees. 
As to the United States, the conversation focused on Guantanamo Bay 
detainees.33 Having decided it could be legally permissible for a State to trans-
fer detainees to a third State, the United States, a participant stated, is obliged 
to determine the conditions under which a transfer could be performed. 
Such determinations are individualized. Some participants noted that, in their 
view, it is not always possible or advisable for the United States to return a 
                                                                                                                      
33. There are essentially three different types of dispositions for Guantanamo detain-
ees: continued NIAC detention, referral for prosecution or transfer to a third State. The 
Guantanamo Review Task Force initially determined these dispositions in 2009. At that 
time, a fourth category of “conditional detention” was included for thirty Yemeni detainees. 
See FINAL REPORT GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, supra note 25. 
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detainee to the detainee’s home State because of security and humane treat-
ment concerns. One participant noted that the United States has expressed 
a belief that certain provisions of IHRL do not apply extraterritorially except 
in narrow circumstances and that those exceptions do not arise with respect 
to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.34 According to this view, the United 
States is not legally bound to apply the Convention Against Torture35 either 
when transferring detainees from outside of its territory to another State or 
when considering whether those detainees would likely be tortured in the 
destination State, but would, as a matter of policy, seek humane treatment 
assurances and assess whether these assurances were made in good faith. A 
number of participants strongly disagreed with this interpretation of the law. 
In addition, some participants noted that other rules and principles of inter-
national law would apply in that context. 
The discussion also touched on U.S. policy standards concerning treat-
ment. When deemed necessary, the United States also seeks post-transfer 
monitoring assurances. The behavior of States that have received detainees 
is also assessed in an ongoing fashion. The provision of assistance such as 
language classes, financial support, housing, family reunification and assign-
ment of legal status were highlighted as important to help ensure (in the eyes 
of the United States) a relatively “successful” transfer. It was said that the 
United States carries out measures with a view to helping detainees integrate 
into the societies to which they are transferred. In doing so, the United States 
                                                                                                                      
34. For the U.S. position on the extraterritorial application of the ICCPR, see U.S. De-
partment of State, Fourth Periodic Report of the United States of America to the United 
Nations Committee on Human Rights Concerning the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, ¶¶ 504–05 (Dec. 30, 2011), https://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/179781.htm. 
For the circumstances where the United States accepts extraterritorial application of the 
Convention Against Torture, see Acting Legal Adviser Mary E. McLeod, U.S. Department 
of State, Opening Statement to the U.N. Committee Against Torture: U.S. Affirms Torture 
is Prohibited at All Times in All Places (Nov. 12–13, 2014), https://geneva.usmis-
sion.gov/2014/11/12/acting-legal-adviser-mcleod-u-s-affirms-torture-is-prohibited-at-all-
times-in-all-places/; John Bellinger, U.S. Delegation Asserts Article 16 of Convention Against Tor-
ture Applies Outside U.S. Territory in Certain Circumstances, but Law of Armed Conflict “Takes Prec-
edence” In Situations of Armed Conflict, LAWFARE (Nov. 12, 2014), https://www.lawfare-
blog.com/us-delegation-asserts-article-16-convention-against-torture-applies-outside-us-
territority-certain. 
35. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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aims to reduce the security risk that former detainees might otherwise pose.36 
Ultimately, it was noted that the approval of a transfer depends not on 
whether a detainee was a threat, but on whether that threat could be mitigated 
outside detention. Accordingly to one commenetator, four elements consid-
ered vital to that assessment are travel restrictions, monitoring, information 
sharing and integration assistance. 
In contrast to the U.S. approach to detainees held at Guantanamo Bay, 
Colombia largely relies on its domestic criminal law system rather than on 
security detention. Where detentions that might otherwise be considered to 
be conducted in relation to NIAC do occur, they are based on so-called “or-
dinary” criminal law (that is, municipal criminal law). Likewise, prosecutions 
are generally for criminal offenses that do not require a connection to an 
armed conflict. As a matter of law, membership in the Fuerzas Armadas 
Revolucionarias de Colombia (FARC) is not, in itself, criminalized under the 
domestic law of Colombia; however, in practice, the broad reach of Colom-
bia’s conspiracy law means that membership in the FARC amounts to a 
crime. It was stated that Colombia avoided security detention both because 
administrative detention was considered unnecessary—criminal prosecu-
tions were seen as sufficient—and due to the abuse of such detention in the 
1980s. 
A few broader issues arose in relation to disposition generally, including 
post-transfer monitoring and the utility of security detention versus certain 
alternatives. The discussion touched, for instance, on when post-transfer 
monitoring should end in circumstances where such monitoring is imple-
mented either by the original detaining State or the State to which the de-
tainee has been transferred. Participants also examined perceived benefits of 
security detention versus criminal detention. It was suggested that if interna-
tional law was interpreted in a way that rendered security detention largely 
infeasible for States, States would nonetheless likely resort to other methods 
to achieve the security results they sought. Thus, under this view, before ar-
guing in favor of increased legal regulation of security detention, considera-
tion should be given to whether the alternatives (such as criminal prosecu-
tion) would result in a better system, and, if so, for whom. It would be worth-
while, according to this view, to step back and assess whether the key deci-
sionmakers in that alternative system, and the persons detained pursuant to 
it, would be better or worse positioned. 
                                                                                                                      
36. Declaration of Daniel Fried, Special Envoy for the Closure of the Guantanamo Bay 
Detention Facility, U.S. Department of State (Nov. 25, 2009), https://www.state.gov/doc-
uments/organization/153570.pdf. 
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VI. SESSION FIVE 
 
This session examined the issue of the so-called “irreducible few” (Guan-
tanamo detainees who reportedly will not be transferred to another State nor 
tried) and whether they could (continue to) be legally detained. In the course 
of this session, a number of issues from previous sessions were revisited in 
the specific context of Guantanamo, including domestic law authorization, 
the length of detention and criminal prosecution versus security detention. 
In addition, practical issues were discussed surrounding the sort of facility in 
which the remaining detainees would be held if Guantanamo is closed. 
In relation to a potential new facility, certain participants raised the 
Walsh Report as a starting point for establishing appropriate standards.37 It 
was suggested that it might be difficult to assess the cost of a new facility 
without, for example, a detailed engineering study, but that such an endeavor 
would likely result in long-term cost savings. Moreover, a participant argued 
that legal changes requiring congressional action are necessary if establishing 
a secure long-term detention policy in the United States is the goal. Some 
participants suggested three prototypes for such a facility: 
 
1. Acquiring an existing (but possibly non-operating) Department of 
Defense facility; 
2. Transferring the functions of a currently operating Department of 
Defense facility (likely a prison) and using the facility purely for (se-
curity) detention; 
3. Building a new facility, likely on federal land where there was an ex-
isting Department of Defense facility. 
 
One participant suggested, however, that even such facilities would risk 
effectively being perceived as “Guantanamo North,” thereby including the 
adverse connotations some associate with the Guantanamo facility. Several 
participants were apprehensive about the effects of detention at Guan-
tanamo on future U.S. detention operations. A view was articulated, for ex-
                                                                                                                      
37. U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT COMPLIANCE WITH 
PRESIDENT’S EXECUTIVE ORDER ON DETAINEE CONDITIONS OF CONFINEMENT (2009). 
See also Peter Finn & Del Quentin Wilber, Pentagon Review Finds Guantanamo Conditions Meet 
Geneva Conventions, but Urges More Interaction for Some Detainees, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 
2009); William Glaberson, Guantánamo Meets Geneva Rules, Pentagon Study Finds N.Y. TIMES 
(Feb. 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/21/us/21gitmo.html. 
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ample, that proportionally more resources are being allocated toward Guan-
tanamo than are merited when seen in the broader context of detention and 
the other security-related concerns the government seeks to address. Addi-
tionally, it was observed that Guantanamo had shaped a generation of U.S. 
military personnels’ and policymakers’ attitudes toward detention. There was 
concern among some participants that a purportedly excessive legalistic ap-
proach toward detention after 9/11 has focused government actors on the 
question of what they could do, not on what they should do. 
Moving beyond the specific issue of Guantanamo Bay, three approaches 
for the future of U.S. detention were considered: 
 
 A “light footprint” model. This approach would involve fewer de-
tainees held for shorter periods. In this scenario, questions might 
arise as to the applicable international law—such as IHL, IHRL or, 
perhaps, a combination of frameworks—as well as the geographic, 
temporal, material and personal scope of the relevant international 
law. The “light footprint” model might also give rise to concerns 
regarding non-refoulement, if, for example, detainees are transferred 
more quickly to or with less vetting of partner forces.38 
 
 Longer-term detention due to increased on-the-ground 
fighting against ISIS. In this scenario, a NIAC with extraterritorial 
elements was assumed. There could be difficult questions about in-
terpreting and applying international law and domestic law, a partic-
ipant suggested, in relation to detention abroad of ISIS fighters 
(many of whom are “foreign fighters” in the sense that they are na-
tionals of States other than the territorial States in which they are 
fighting), and whether the detention takes place in Iraq, Syria or else-
where. 
 
                                                                                                                      
38. On non-refoulement, see INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COM-
MENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF 
THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 708–16 (2d ed. 2016) 
[hereinafter 2016 COMMENTARY]; Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 33, 
July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 137; U.S. Department of State, One-Year Follow-up Response 
of the United States of America to Recommendations of the Committee Against Torture 
on its Combined Third to Fifth Periodic Reports (Nov. 27, 2015), http://www.state.gov/j/ 
drl/rls/250342.htm. 
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 More detainees captured from outside the territories where the 
United States currently purports to be engaged in a NIAC. A 
main issue in this regard was whether the groups with which detain-
ees were affiliated, irrespective of where the capture of an individual 
detainee took place, would be considered a party to an armed conflict 
against the United States, as that concept is defined under interna-
tional humanitarian law. Some commentators, it was noted, believe 
that the fighting in each location must reach the armed conflict 
threshold for that specific situation to qualify as an armed conflict. 
Pursuant to this view, it cannot be assumed that detention of an ISIS 
fighter outside of the territory of an active armed conflict is con-
ducted in relation to that armed conflict. Instead, a case-by-case anal-
ysis must be undertaken. 
 
Participants then returned to the issue of the domestic (U.S.) law basis 
for detention, whether resulting from on-the-ground fighting or from cap-
ture of detainees outside of areas where the United States is conducting hos-
tilities as part of an armed conflict. It was suggested that the 2001 AUMF 
might provide a sufficient domestic law basis to detain individuals who qual-
ify as members of the “associated forces” identified in the 2012 National 
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).39 Discussion focused in part on 
whether al Qaeda and ISIS had or continued to have, for purposes of U.S. 
law, a legally relevant connection to each other. According to one view, the 
splintering is relevant with respect to domestic law. Pursuant to this line of 
thinking, the argument that the 2001 AUMF and the NDAA cover ISIS 
members would be stronger if the United States had been continuously en-
gaged as a party to conflict in Iraq from the conflict’s beginning to the pre-
sent. Other participants noted that some U.S. courts have accepted a broad 
interpretation of the 2001 AUMF with respect to who may fall within the 
definition of “associated forces.”40 
The discussion also raised international law issues regarding connections 
(if any)—in the past and currently—between ISIS and al Qaeda, especially 
following their reported “split.” In that regard, some participants questioned 
whether in fact an armed conflict could be said to exist in relation to all such 
                                                                                                                      
39. See National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, supra note 13, § 
1021(b)(1). 
40. See, e.g., Barhoumi v. Obama, 609 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2010); Hamlily v. Obama, 616 
F. Supp. 2d 63 (D.D.C. 2009); Gherebi v. Obama, 609 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.D.C. 2009). 
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so-called “associated forces.” These participants believed that the U.S. do-
mestic law concept of “associated forces” may be difficult to reconcile with 
the IHL concept of (distinct) organized armed groups and with their under-
standing that hostilities conducted with a particular NSAG must reach a suf-
ficient threshold of intensity before a NIAC can be said to exist with respect 
to that particular NSAG. The issue was said to matter in part because the 
U.S. approach to detention allows for the capture and deprivation of liberty 
of “associated forces” wherever such forces are located. 
This session returned to the topic of legal grounds for initial and contin-
ued detention. Several participants rejected the legality under international 
law of detention until the end of hostilities. Several other participants agreed 
that detention until the end of conflict would give too much weight to mili-
tary necessity in IHL’s balance between humanity and military necessity. 
Others disagreed, claiming there was no time limitation on detention im-
posed by international law as long as hostilities in the relevant conflict con-
tinued. If anything, they maintained, the release of some Guantanamo de-
tainees during the conflict, rather than their continued detention, was a his-
torical aberration. In response, the concern was raised that given the pro-
tracted nature of the current conflict, or conflicts, detention until the end of 
hostilities could last much longer than it had in the past, effectively resulting 
in indefinite detention. Among those who considered that there should not 
be a time limitation on detention, a view was expressed that there would 
likely be insufficient evidence or, in some instances, a lack of grounds to 
institute criminal proceedings against detainees who remain a security threat, 
necessitating their continued detention. One participant suggested altering 
U.S. detention policy so that the default option would be detention for a 
certain limited period—such as six months, instead of non-temporally-
bounded detention—with the option of renewing the detention, as repeat-
edly as merited, depending on whether the individual concerned remained a 
threat. 
Participants revisited whether membership in a NSAG alone could jus-
tify continued detention or, rather, whether it should be legally required to 
assess if the individual remains a security threat. In this regard, several par-
ticipants stated that being a member of a NSAG, in and of itself, constituted 
an imperative threat to security that would permit NIAC detention. A num-
ber of others viewed the two standards as distinct, although one might over-
lap with the other. A participant suggested that many Guantanamo detainees 
were initially captured and held solely due to their membership in a group, 
rather than on the basis of an individual threat to security. According to that 
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participant, constituting a sufficient ongoing threat—not membership in a 
NSAG alone—is the relevant standard under IHL for continued detention. 
Some commentators questioned, for instance, how the Periodic Review 
Boards (PRBs)41 could determine that a detainee no longer posed a signifi-
cant, continuing threat to U.S. security where the government’s initial deci-
sion to detain was based on that person’s membership in a designated group, 
rather than on any specific individual threat posed by that detainee. 
 
VII. SESSION SIX 
 
In this session, the issues previously discussed concerning legal basis, 
grounds and procedures were addressed in the particular context of deten-
tion carried out by non-State armed groups. The question of whether—and, 
if so, when—States could be held responsible for violations by NSAGs was 
also discussed. 
Reference was made to Serdar Mohammed, a prominent case challenging 
British detention policy in Afghanistan that was, at the time, being adjudi-
cated in the United Kingdom’s judicial system.42 Discussion then moved to 
the relevant frameworks applicable to detention by armed groups and to the 
issue of whether armed groups may detain under IHL or other potentially 
relevant frameworks. A number of participants articulated the view that it 
would be difficult for an armed group to find a legal basis to detain. In this 
regard, an opinion was expressed that if armed groups do not have the au-
thority to detain under IHL, and in line with Serdar Mohammed, then neither 
would the government have that power, if one follows the logic of the equal-
ity of belligerents.43 
Irrespective of the legal basis for detention issue, it was noted that, in 
practice, many NSAGs do detain. A number of participants expressed the 
view that this was a relatively good thing, as the alternative, in some situa-
tions, has been summary execution. In this context, it was pointed out that 
                                                                                                                      
41. For information on the PBRs, see U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, PERIODIC RE-
VIEW SECRETARIAT, THE PERIODIC REVIEW BOARD, http://www.prs.mil/About-the-
PRB/ (last visited June 28, 2017). 
42. Mohammed v. Ministry of Defence, [2014] EWHC (QB) 1369 [hereinafter Moham-
med 2014]; Mohammed 2015, supra note 18. 
43. Mohammed 2014, supra note 42, ¶¶ 236, 245. On the equality of belligerents, see, for 
example, Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Laws of War: A Principle under Pressure, 90 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 952 (2008). 
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armed groups have obligations in the event they detain individuals. A num-
ber of participants maintained that NSAGs must neither violate prohibitions 
on discriminatory treatment nor conduct such operations for reasons other 
than imperative threats to security. Further, by this view, the NSAGs must 
provide a review process for detainees that includes an independent and im-
partial body with the capacity to order the detainee’s release, and the detainee 
must have an opportunity to challenge the evidence. Notwithstanding these 
general statements, it was recognized by several participants that such pro-
cedures might look different in practice when carried out by armed groups, 
as opposed to States, and might be difficult to implement. For example, these 
participants questioned the form an independent and impartial review would 
take when performed by an armed group. The possible challenges posed by 
capacity limitations were also raised. Furthermore, it was noted that, while 
some armed groups have established their own law or relied upon the law of 
the State, the focus generally has been on criminal detention, rather than 
security detention (or internment). 
 It was suggested by one participant that, contrary to the conventional 
view that armed groups are not bound by IHRL, that body of law might 
provide additional obligations. For example, this participant argued that 
IHRL—while often viewed as binding only States—may be interpreted as 
also binding NSAGs. To support that proposition, the commentator noted 
that several international human rights treaties address third parties; that 
some national court decisions apply human rights law to private actors; that 
customary law has been viewed as binding upon international organizations; 
that Commissions of Inquiry reports to the UN Human Rights Council have 
stated that armed groups are bound by IHRL; and that the UN Security 
Council has sanctioned an armed group in Cote d’Ivoire for violating the 
rights of children. 
Other participants argued against this approach, noting, for example, 
that the high standards IHRL imposes on States might be diluted if NSAGs 
were also required to fulfill human rights requirements. Along the same lines, 
it was noted that most NSAGs would likely be unable in practice to fulfill 
State-level standards, which might lead to an overall lowering of standards. 
The discussion turned to accountability for violations of obligations per-
taining to detention. Before considering the issue of responsibility for viola-
tions, the specific violation of enforced disappearances was discussed. In 
particular, it was suggested that detention by a NSAG could be interpreted 
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as constituting the crime against humanity of enforced disappearance pursu-
ant to the relevant provision in the Rome Statute of the International Crim-
inal Court, which provides that 
 
‘[e]nforced disappearance of persons’ means the arrest, detention or ab-
duction of persons by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence 
of, a State or a political organization, followed by a refusal to acknowledge 
that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or wherea-
bouts of those persons, with the intention of removing them from the pro-
tection of the law for a prolonged period of time.44 
 
However, a participant suggested that the Court would likely examine the 
conduct of members of armed groups, rather than considering whether de-
tention was lawful in the first place. Another participant stated that if IHL 
did not prohibit or authorize detention, then detention by NSAGs would 
not be a crime under international law and, instead, would be regulated only 
as a matter of domestic law. 
This conversation led to a discussion of whether NSAGs could be held 
responsible for detention that is illegal or is conducted in an unlawful man-
ner. The U.S. Alien Torts Statute45 was mentioned as one way a NSAG could, 
if the detention violated the law of nations, be pursued in a domestic court. 
This Statute was also suggested as a means to hold a State that facilitates the 
unlawful activities of an armed group accountable for that assistance. It was 
noted, however, that a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision significantly con-
strained the law’s extraterritorial effect.46 
The Arms Trade Treaty (ATT), which the United States has signed but 
not ratified, was raised as a possible means by which States could be discour-
aged from, or held accountable for, supporting certain forms of detention 
that violate IHL and that are conducted by a NSAG. The ATT prohibits the 
transfer of arms if the State party “has knowledge at the time of authoriza-
tion” of the transfer that the arms “would be used in the commission of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, grave breaches of the Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949, attacks directed against civilian objects or civilians protected 
                                                                                                                      
44. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 7(2)(i). The first part of the Article requires that a 
crime against humanity be “committed as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed 
against any civilian population.” Id., art. 7(1). 
45. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012). 
46. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013) (finding that the Alien 
Tort Statute presumptively does not apply extraterritorily). 
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as such, or other war crimes as defined by international agreements to which 
it is a Party.”47 In Article 7, the ATT also requires that State parties refrain 
from the arms transfer if there is an “overriding risk” that those arms could 
be used to commit, or contribute to the commission of, serious IHL or 
IHRL violations.48 
It was noted that a State may breach its obligations under the ATT where 
the State fails to satisfy the applicable due diligence obligations with respect 
to considering possible violations of arms use covered by the ATT. In that 
connection, a participant emphasized that the ATT can be interpreted as 
imposing an obligation on States parties not to provide arms to a NSAG, 
where the State has knowledge that the NSAG uses those arms to commit 
war crimes, or where there is an “overriding risk” that the group could use 
those arms to conduct detention constituting a serious violation of IHL. 
Such a breach of an obligation laid down in the ATT, a participant suggested, 
was separate from general international law principles concerning non-inter-
ference in the domestic affairs of a third State through the provisions of arms 
to a NSAG operating in that third State. 
Participants also mentioned that a State could be held responsible in sit-
uations where the State exercised sufficient control over a NSAG, in line, 
for example, with the jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ),49 or Article 8 of the (Draft) Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts.50 One participant suggested that a rule anal-
ogous to Article 16 of the Articles on State Responsibility, which applies only 
between States51 could arguably exist with regard to State complicity in 
wrongful acts of NSAGs. 
The focus then turned to what relevant obligations, if any, Common Ar-
ticle 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions (which obliges High Contracting 
                                                                                                                      
47. Arms Trade Treaty art. 6(3), Apr. 2, 2013, 52 INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MATERIALS 
988 (entered into force Dec. 24, 2014). 
48. Id. art 7. 
49. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S), 1986 
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 115 (June 27) [hereinafter Nicaragua]. 
50. Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts art. 8, Report 
of the International Law Commission, 53d Sess., Apr. 23–June 1, July 2–Aug. 10, 2001, 
U.N. Doc. A/56/10, GAOR 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 YEAR-
BOOK OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION 32, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/SER.A/ 
2001/Add.1 (Part 2) (“Conduct directed or controlled by a State”). 
51. Id. art. 16 (“Aid or assistance in the commission of an internationally wrongful act”). 
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Parties “to respect and to ensure respect” for the Conventions “in all cir-
cumstances”) might generate. Differing views were expressed on the scope 
of application of Common Article 1 when read in conjunction with Com-
mon Article 3. One opinion was that the obligation to “ensure respect” un-
der Common Article 1 did not extend to NIACs. This, it was argued, is clear 
from the original ICRC Commentary on Common Article 1, which states 
that the Article does not apply to civil wars.52 Another commentator disa-
greed, stating that because the language of Common Article 1—“in all cir-
cumstances”—is unambiguous, it is unnecessary to turn to a secondary 
source of interpretation, such as the commentaries. Thus, the obligations 
contained in Common Article 1 perforce applied to NIACs regulated by 
Common Article 3 (since NIACs are by definition part of the “all circum-
stances” to which the provision explicitly applies). State practice was cited in 
support of that opinion.53 
Commentators also debated to whom the obligation that High Contract-
ing Parties “undertake to . . . ensure respect” applies. One view was that the 
duty is limited to High Contracting Parties that are involved in an armed 
conflict vis-à-vis those under their control, such as the civilians located in their 
country. The other view considered that the obligation extends beyond the 
particular State party to the conflict (and those under its control) to all High 
Contracting Parties. All High Contracting Parties are obliged, according to 
this view, to do what is reasonably possible to ensure respect of the law by 
other States, and possibly by NSAGs.54 Further to this discussion, reference 
was made to the ICJ’s Nicaragua judgment and its finding that States may not 
“encourage” individuals or NSAGs to violate IHL, as support for an obliga-
tion found within Common Article 1.55 A commentator maintained that, in 
fact, this obligation did not stem from Common Article 1, but rather from 
the duty under general international law for States to refrain from encourag-
ing others to violate international legal norms. 
 
                                                                                                                      
52. COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I FOR THE AMELIORATION OF THE 
CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED FORCES IN THE FIELD 26 (Jean 
Pictet ed., 1952). See 2016 COMMENTARY, supra note 38, ¶ 153, for an updated version. 
53. ICRC CIHL Study, supra note 8, r. 144. 
54. The latter view is represented in 2016 COMMENTARY supra note 38, ¶¶ 143–73. A 
participant mentioned the ICJ’s Wall opinion, as providing support for this view. See Legal 
Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory 
Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 159 (July 9). 
55. Nicaragua, supra note 49, ¶ 220. 
 
 
 
The Future of U.S. Detention under International Law Vol. 93 
 
297 
 
 
 
 
 
 
VIII. SESSION SEVEN 
 
During the final session, participants attempted to consolidate and analyze 
some of the main strands of the discussion, addressing whether and how 
IHL provisions on detention should be developed. 
In this regard, a common theme throughout the workshop was the in-
teraction between law and policy in relation to detention. Participants often 
disagreed about whether a system that involved (relatively) few legal rules 
and in which detention standards were, in certain key respects, largely a mat-
ter of policy was preferable to a system where most detention standards were 
determined as a matter of law.  
One view held that the current state of international law on detention 
was generally acceptable. By this view, Common Article 3’s brevity and gen-
erality are strengths. For example, it would be infeasible and unadvisable, 
according to this approach, to try to list all possible types of inhumane treat-
ment. Moreover, pursuant to this line of argument, to the extent that Com-
mon Article 3 is sparse, policy can help provide greater detail. Those holding 
this view observed that the United States has high policy standards on de-
tention. Rather than focusing on developing new legal rules, increased atten-
tion should be, for these participants, placed on enforcing the laws that do 
exist, with greater attention being paid to violations by NSAGs. A policy 
focus also provides flexibility, allowing States to adapt their detention ap-
proaches to the exigencies of a variety of conflicts around the globe. Addi-
tionally, this view held that, if law becomes the dominant language for mak-
ing detention decisions, there is a risk that the governmental focus would be 
on what States could do, not on what they should do. 
Other participants strongly disagreed. They worried that basing practice 
largely on policy rather than law could render detention operations suscep-
tible to frequent, difficult-to-predict and potentially significant changes; cre-
ate illogical or impracticable inconsistencies (for example, disparate practices 
between coalition partners); set a bad example for other States; and lead to a 
continued, or increased, resort to courts by civil society actors and detainees 
in an attempt to discern and contest the parameters concerning the legality 
of detention. They also believed that singling out particular rules or policies 
from a complex, disparately interpreted and applied set of normative frame-
works, whether by analogy from IHL rules applicable in an IAC or as a mat-
ter of policy, would tend to facilitate a government’s ability to selectively 
choose the parts of law that permitted their acts and not apply rules that 
restricted them. In the eyes of these participants, selectivity risked upsetting 
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IHL’s balance between military necessity and humanity. In response to 
States’ reluctance to spell out their beliefs about what IHL says, a number of 
participants expressed a desire for governmental actors to offer explicit, clear 
statements as to their understanding of existing law. 
The role of IHRL in filling perceived “gaps” in IHL resurfaced in a num-
ber of discussions. Several commentators maintained that if IHRL does or 
should fill those gaps, the resulting legal regime might be more stringent than 
one in which there were clear IHL rules regulating all aspects of detention in 
relation to a NIAC. Moreover, it was asserted that notwithstanding its posi-
tion on the extraterritorial application of IHRL, U.S. respect for that body 
of law was important in part because many U.S. partners recognize the ap-
plication of IHRL in relation to NIACs with an extraterritorial element and 
because a narrow interpretation of IHRL may undercut the objective and 
purpose of that legal framework. In terms of the future of the law, the idea 
of a bifurcation in IHL (“regular NIACs” v. “extraterritorial NIACs”), 
wherein different legal rules would apply to each, was criticized by some 
participants, who stated that the substantive rules of IHL should not be 
meaningfully different in these two types of NIACs. 
A number of participants expressed a desire for greater discussion of and 
clarity around grounds and procedures for security detention. Caution was 
voiced on different occasions against an automatic assumption that domestic 
criminal proceedings would necessarily provide more protection to individ-
uals than would security detention. There was also concern that the interna-
tional community is allowing legal interpretations adopted in certain purport-
edly unconventional contexts—including NIACs with extraterritorial ele-
ments—to shape how the rules governing detention are interpreted or de-
veloped in other contexts, without sufficient consideration of the benefits 
and costs of doing so. 
A recurring theme was the growing complexity that NIACs posed, cre-
ating legal, policy and operational challenges for detention. Alongside IHL, 
there is an increasingly elaborate framework of soft law, domestic law and 
IRHL, as well as policy considerations. In addition to the lack of clarity in 
the law specifically applicable to detention, dilemmas regarding the interpre-
tation of other aspects of IHL touch on detention, such as the end of hos-
tilities. A number of participants noted that IHL is a body of law meant to 
be accessible, realistic and practical—rules that eighteen-year-old service 
members can apply and that can be carried out by armed groups. Yet, be-
cause of these various factors, there are multiple layers of ambiguity and the 
rules regulating detention in relation to NIACs are often unclear or disputed. 
